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Abstract
Laeven,  Klingebiel,  and Kroszner investigate  the link  financial systems.  They hypothesize that the deepening  of
ke-LW,een  financial  crises anA  inAustry g rowth. Thley  the financial  systemL  allows sectors dependent on external
analyze data from  19 industrial  and developing countries  finance to obtain relatively  more external funding in
that have  experienced  financiat crises during tne past 30  normal  perioas,  so a crisis in sucn counrries wouia nave  a
years to investigate  how financial crises affect sectors  disproportionately  negative effect on externally
dependent on external  sources  of finance. Specifically,  dependent sectors.  In contrast,  since externally
the authors examine  whether the impact  of a financial  dependent  firms tend to obtain relatively less external
crisis on externally dependent sectors varies with the  financing  in shallower financial systems  (and hence have
depth of the financial  system. They find that sectors  relatively  lower growth rates in such countries during
highly dependent on external  finance tend  to experience  normal times),  a crisis  in such countries has less of a
a  grpntpr cnntrnction of valiuie  addelped  tduring  n rrisis in  dispnronrtinnntelv neantive  effect on the grnwth of
deeper financial systems than  in countries with shallower  externally dependent sectors.
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While it is widely accepted that financial crises have adverse consequences for the economy
as a whole, relatively little empirical work investigates the mechanisms by which financial crises
generate problems in the real sector.  In this paper, we analyze data from developed and developing
countries that have experienced financial crises during the last 30 years to investigate the impact of
cri1scs onI irLU1sUIal  roLWU L i  I  oL&ULUIes.  Understar dIingU  UUZi  i111pact is  C.ucial for  ruILIaUinLg11
policies  to mitigate  the costs of a crisis in the  financial sector to the economy as  a whole  and
contributes to the literature on the mechanisms linking financial shocks and real economic activity.
Much theoretical work has been done on how financial intermediaries and financial markets
facilitate investment by firms and, hence, promote economic growth (see Levine (1997) and Rajan
and Zingales (1998) for comprehensive overviews).  Financial intermediaries and financial markets
are  grvaially  UIVLou=L  Lt  reUuc  ieiLiv  al  aZatu  aiu  adverGVe  sIVle6LIVU  jJIVLUeUI  LIW.L  U  c  Lar  mak  raising
extemal  funds  difficult  and expensive  for firms.  Well-functioning  and well-developed  financial
intermediaries  and markets thus should disproportionately benefit firms that are most dependent on
extemal  funds to finance  their growth.  Conversely,  crises in the  financial  sector  should have  a
disproportionately  negative  impact  on  firms  that rely  heavily on  external  sources  of finance.
Specifically, we investigate whether the impact of  a financial crisis on sectors dependent on extemal
sources of finanLcing varies  witiL  u1v lvevl  W.  UoVf  UPelII.etL  o  UIV,  MiBArLidI  syLVItLI.  Lv evaiuatL  ui.
empirical relevance  of this theoretical mechanism,  our empirical work focuses on the differential
impact of financial crises on sectoral growth.
To preview our results, we find that in well developed and deep financial systems, sectors
highly dependent on extemal finance tend to experience a greater contraction of  value added during a
Icrisis than do externally dependent sectors in countries with shallower financial systems. As has been
shown in previous work (Rajan and Zingales,  1998), the depth of the financial system appears to
relax credit constraints to permit externally dependent sectors to grow faster during normal periods.
To  explain  our results,  we  hypothesize  that  the  depth  of the  financial  system  allows  sectors
dependent on external  finance to obtain relatively more external funding in normal periods;  so a
;Lsis  wJUl  hIave  a  UdFi  VVIVtioateLY  U&aLl  V 1IeILVct onU  VAL.Lally  UIUepUeUVL  LJlUs.  In  V.ULUdbL,
since externally  dependent  firms tend  to  obtain  relatively  less external  financing  in shallower
financial systems (hence, we observe relatively lower growth rates in externally dependent sectors in
such countries during  normal times), a crisis  in such  countries  has less of a disproportionately
negative  effect  on the  growth of these  sectors.  These  results provide  evidence  supporting the
existence  of a "credit channel"  through which  firms dependent on  external finance  are harmed
LLiOJ-oL  oi.iL  JLmaely  dLLU  L1  peIrO1AJiod  oJf fLJL-La.iG  UisUCrs.
In the next section, we provide a more detailed motivation for the approach we are taking and
relate our work to the existing literature. Section m explains our econometric approach. Section IV
then describes the data and, in particular, how we measure financial dependence and how we define
financial  crises.  Section  V contains  the results.  Section  VI presents  a number of caveats  and
qualifications with respect to our analysis. Section VII concludes.
H.  Motivations and relation to previous work
There exists a large body of empirical  literature on the link between finance and growth.
Levine and Zervos (1998) study whether stock markets and banks promote economic growth. They
find that measures  of stock  market liquidity and private sector credit have  a strong independent
2effect on growth. Controlling for potential biases, Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) argue that there
exists  a  clear empirical  relation between  the level of financial  intermediary  development  and
economic  growth. They find that financial  intermediaries  exert a large, positive impact on total
factor productivity growth, which feeds through to overall economic growth.
Jayarante  and Strahan (1996) provide  evidence that financial  markets  can directly affect
econorric  g  Io,%?2b  atIdylAthie rea.o  f bar.  vorgih  re+;;cion  ;r."^  'he TT-;teA  S0+t.-  T.M-
find that the rates of real, per capita growth in income and output increase signiticantly following
intrastate branch reform. Improvements in the quality of  bank lending, not increased volume of bank
lending, appear to be responsible for faster growth.
Rajan and Zingales  (1998) examine whether financial  development  facilitates  economic
growth by reducing the costs of external finance to firms. They find that industrial sectors that are
relat.ively morn.e in need of e  W  i.Ance devel.op  `ropor.tion  oly 
4 fat  ;r.i con.es  "a  mth..ore-
developed financial markets. As we discuss in more detail in the next section, they also overcome
some of the identification problems embedded in standard cross-country growth regressions by using
an interaction between a country characteristic  (financial development of  a particular country)  and
an industry characteristic  (external  financial dependence  of a particular industry)  in addition  to
country indicators and industry indicators.
Demirga9-Kunt  an.d M  ?irl.o1snovZc  (1997)  show  tuhat w,ell-developed  finan.cial  system.s  are
associated  with extemally  financed fimn growth.  rhey also find that differences  in legal systems
affect firms'  use of external financing to fund growth: in countries with efficient  legal systems, a
greater proportion of firms use long-term external financing.
There  exists  also  a large  empirical  literature  on the existence  of a credit channel.  This
3literature tries to investigate to what extent adverse  shocks to a borrower's net worth increase the
cost of extemal financing, and through which channels these adverse effects occur. For households,
Mishkin (1977)  provides evidence of effects of household balance sheet conditions on consumer
expenditures in the US during the 1973-75  depression.
Kashvap and Stein (2000) study the monetarv-transmission mechanism using quarterly data
on  every insured US  comm.ercial  bank  for the period  19764993.  They find  that the im.pact of
monetary policy on lending is stronger for banks with less liquid balance  sheets, i.e., banks with
lower ratios of securities to assets. Moreover, this pattem is largely attributable to the smaller banks.
Their results support the existence of a "bank lending channel" of monetary transmission, though
they do not allow us to make precise statements  about its quantitative importance.
Peek and Rosengren (2000) use the Japanese banking crisis as a natural experiment to test
WCUhICI  a  ivan.  suply  shJLJck  CLI  Lafe  I  .ea  LA  ecor.or...  act  v .t.  B  uts  was"  1I'J...I"lY  CLiI  V.J  to  US
credit markets,  yet connected  through  the Japanese  bank penetration of US markets,  this  event
allows one to identify an exogenous loan supply shock and ultimately link that shock to construction
activity in U.S. commercial real estate markets.  They exploit the variation  across geographically
distinct commercial real estate markets to establish conclusively that loan supply shocks emanating
from Janan had real effects on economic activity in the United States.
tiAggrea  teL  4aIU LiULarciai shvcAs canar.%AL  ui1c  thevcopvratLe  seoLrU  by  ULL  LailJing ceitGAUL,  iUr.L1u1g
working capital and trade financing, to borrowers with valuable trading and investment opportunities
(see Kashyap and Stein (1994) for a review). Real, financial or regulatory shocks can cause a real or
perceived  shortage of capital for banks. As a result, banks may become unwilling to lend even to
viable companies and instead may prefer to invest excess liquidity in safe assets such as government
4WPS2854  Rich and Powerful? Subjective  Michael Lokshin  June 2002  C. Cunanan
Power and Welfare in  Russia  Martin  Ravallion  32301bonds.  A credit crunch can originate from weak financial institutions or from tightened regulation
and supervision.  Increased uncertainty about whether and at what price loans will be available can
also  result  in  a shortage  of loanable  funds  (Stiglitz  and  Weiss,  1981).  These  effects  can  be
particularly severe for bank lending because banks are more likely than other financial intermediaries
or markets to lend to firms that suffer from a greater degree of informational asymmetries.
JU  n  audi-11ra  A  z  ll  l.-,ce sheet  e,e  car  ltr  ai.wplifi  the pffooft  of  shckhnsr  nin
corporations (see Bemanke and Gertier (i995) tor a review).  Agenor and Aizenman (Ii999),  Chan-
Lau and Chen (1998), Kim and  Stone (1999)  in a domestic context and Greenwald (1999) in an
international  context show  that generally  weaknesses  in the financial  sector  along with tighter
regulation and supervision appear to contribute to corporate distress by curbing credit. Ding, Domac
and Ferri (1998) and Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) provide some empirical evidence that tighter rules for
11i1llarlcal  LllOtIL.^-JIOn  zfetd  h  upply MA larAU1,al  L%nds%&  insvrlco-;s  ha.e  n  ntw.
of corporates were also likely to have been important in reducing the supply of financing.
Empirical research on identifying tools for the resolution and management of banking crises
that are effective in resolving the crisis while limiting adverse economic spillover to the rest of the
economy  is sparse  and most research  in this  area  is  limited to individual  cases.  Honohan and
Klingebiel (2002) use cross-countrv evidence to determine whether specific crisis containment  and
resoluLiVIn  pol1icies  syt...atiLcallJLLLy  inluenceLL,JAV  141e  fiscall costs  owf rewsolvir.g _a  criisiss.  Tr1.-.e  .fi.n.d  hAct
accommodating  policies  - such  as  blanket  deposit  guarantees,  open-ended  liquidity  support,
repeated  recapitalizations, debtor bailouts, and regulatory forbearance - significantly increase fiscal
costs of resolving a crisis.  Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven (2001) review the literature on crises
resolution strategies.
5III. Method
We apply the method in Rajan and Zingales (1998)  to investigate the link between extemal
financial dependence and industrial growth during financial crises. Rajan and Zingales (1998) relate
re.al  grnwth in  va u e  ndded nf a  sertnr tn  an intprqrtinn  ti'rm that  inrhuiii1  a pnrnoyv  f  foin2n,,-ial
development and an index of external financiai dependence. Tney snow tiat nrms that are reiatively
more dependent  on  extemal  finance  develop  disproportionally  faster in  countries  with more-
developed or deeper financial markets, that is, they find a positive relation between the interaction
term and real growth in value added.
Their index of extemal dependence  is constructed at the industry level based on data of US
firrms  Thevychonoe the finanrcial structure of  US industriesaStheir be-ncimirk because the relatively
open, sophisticated, and developed US financial markets shouid allow US firms to face the fewest
obstacles to achieving their desired financial structure. This approach offers a valid and exogenous
way to identify the extent of extemal dependence of an industry anywhere in the world under the
assumption that there are technological and economic reasons why some industries depend more on
extemal finance than others, and that these differences persist across countries. They also overcome
some of thte  identifirqtion  prnblem.s  emh.edded  in  standard  cross-country  growth rperessions by
usingg an interaction between a counry cnaractenstic  knnanciai aeveiopment of  a particuiar country)
and an industry characteristic  (external financial dependence of a particular industry) in addition to
country  indicators  and industry  indicators.  This  approach  allows  them  to  isolate the impact of
financial development  on industry growth after controlling for cross-country and within-country
differences,  and is  therefore  less  subject to criticism  about  an  omitted  variable  bias or model
6specification than traditional approaches. Our main innovation is to apply this approach to industries
in countries experiencing financial crises to be able to investigate the real impact of shocks to the
financial system in a country over time.
First, we estimate the basic model in Rajan and Zingales (1998) for our sample of countries
(model 1).
RVAGR,  = Ci + INDj + A * SHARE,  + P2 * FDi *EDj + -,O  (1)
where R VA GR5, is the real growth in value added of  sectorj in country i, C, is a country dummy for
country i, ii-vD  is an industry dummy for industryj,  SHYLIEiJ  is the snare ot sectorj in the totai
value added of country i, FDi is the development of the financial system of country i, EDj is the
external dependence ratio of sector ] according to Rajan and Zingales (1998). The specification thus
;nlVude  ie  o.tyrdi.us  efcs  euevLe  at.ltvpUisfru.  leveloffnrca
Ui!.UU~lkA~U  AJUI_I  O.IIU  LULUUOUJ  '1  O  YY  TV  UOV  UiILV  il~LVLidLiaVCJVA  JLVO  ILU  UIV LVI  U!  1UI1JAM4
development of a country: total credit to GDP, private sector credit to GDP, and M2 to GDP.
The main differences with the Rajan and Zingales (1998) setup is twofold. First, we estimate
the model for two sub-periods, namely, before and during a financial crisis. When estimating the
model for the crisis period, we use the pre-crisis levels of share in value added and our proxies for
financial development to avoid potential endogeneity problems. Second, we estimate the model for
crLisis  coLU  Ucs  or.ly,  UIaL  is,  for  lviu.uiv  ulaL arVe  liLsteU :... 'aprii  4aU  Illlgvila  (20u0.)  as  IIdvil,g
experienced  a  financial  crisis  (and  for which  we  have  data).  Note  that  by including  country
indicators into the regressions,  we control for country-and industry-specifics.  By including country
7indicators for the crisis period, we are effectively controlling for the general severity of  the crisis in
each country.
We are  also  interested  in the  link between  the interaction  of financial  dependence  and
financial development on the one hand and the difference in real growth in value added between the
cr.isie ,pr:nd  "nd  thp  nr,-.ric  ipriond non the nthpr,khane  Ti  in  an altrrn,tivp enpAfirnt.nn nfmnroPl  (1),
we therefore use the difference in real growtn in value added between the crisis period and the pre-
crisis period as a dependent variable.
ARVAGRU  = Ci +NDj  + Aj *SHAREij +p82 *FDi *EDj +e£  (2)
where  AR VAGR,  is the difference  in real growth in value added of sectorj in country i between the
crisis period and the pre-crisis period. In other words, AR VA GRi  = R VA GRU  Crais  - R VA GRU,pre-crisis X
where  RVAOR-  iS, the re1  Qronwth  in v21uenrl2ddedr nfePr-tnr i in nniintrv i Am-rinc  thr  s4is npri.od
and  RVAGRy,pre-Crisij  iS the real growth in value added of sectorj in country i during the pre-crisis
period.  To avoid potential endogeneity problems, we use the pre-crisis levels of share in value added
and our proxies for financial development.
B101ecause +r  - ... ar  +  she i  .fion  FDi-  * EDjL  -a
the real growth in value added of sectorj in country i, R VAGR 0,  we also estimate the following
model:
iVA  = Ci  + lNL/j + p  *  +  i * HighEDj +  ji  (3)
8where  HighEDj is a dummy variable  for "High External Dependence" that takes value of one if
sectorj is among the top-50% of most financially dependent  sectors of all sectors considered  by
Raian and Zingales (1998),  and zero otherwise  Thiq sefip provides a robustness che-k that controls
for  UiLeasuremenet  error  in  uie  extermai  dependence  ratio-of  each sector  estimated  by Rajan  and
Zingales (1998). In other words, we may expect that the most financially dependent sectors show a
different growth pattern in well-developed countries on average, but there may not necessarily be a
different effect for the most financially dependent sector and the second most financially dependent
sector.  Similar to model (2), we also estimate the following model:
. fTT A  fl  -lT  . f  . *  (Di  X  T  T  T.  r  Hh  T.  mn iK VA  tif  j  L.  =  Ct  17'VLj  t  plSJHAR,  +  (4) Li  ~  Pi 
0 1 U  2  +.
IV.  Data
The industry data is from Rajan  and Zingales (1998).  We use their measure of financial
depe.n.denre bh  sector based on US frn.-level data. Financial or external dendence is colculat  as
the  fraction  oI  capital  expenditures  not  financed  with  cash  flow  from  operations.  The  sectors
considered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) are a mix of three-digit and four-digit ISIC (International
Standard of Industrial Classification)  level industries.  Rather than use the mix of four-digit level
sectoral  breakdowns  for  some  industries  and  three-digit  level  sectorail  breakdowns  for  other
industries in Rajan and Zingales (1998) is somewhat arbitrary, we use external dependence ratios for
sectors on a t.hree-digT4T*'  SIC lee  only. WA  f kotv.ntfo  *e=ciSrulateI  t  1he  w  h  ed  aveage  exte.al-
dependence figure for the four-digit !SIC sectors on a tnree-digit ISIC level. For the sectors that are
9already on  a three-digit  ISIC  level  in Rajan  and Zingales  (1998),  we  simply use  their external
dependence figures. For the sectors that are not already on a three-digit ISIC level, we apply the same
method as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) to financial data on US finns from Compustat to estimate
external dependence  figures. Table  1 lists the three-digit  ISIC level external dependence  figures
across sectors in the United States during the 1980s. We use these external dependence figures to
cor-uc  a hi.  exe.aAeed.c  .IgL.D)d  yval  ht+le vlu  foei  etJi
~AL~LU  L  U%,a 1L"&11  V"%ALI.JLJaL  L.'IU  ~  I&%5~  L.JUUIILIIJ  V  &JLUIO.1,  LUCL& "An.vo  Y"iu"%  j.ii 'jJLIV iJ  0~.VLWJLJ  wL
among the top-50% of  most financially dependent sectors, and value of  zero otherwise. Similarly, we
construct a low external dependence (LowED1) dummy variable that takes value of one if sectorj is
among the bottom-50% of most financially dependent sectors, and value of zero otherwise.
As  measure of firm performance  we use real  growth  in industry value  added (annually
compounded), the same measure as in Raian and Zingales (1998). The data on value added for each
4_-  r,  -nn-,  Cnn-d-,S  . a a1.*-A  4rn-  *1-o T-A-.  o4'~  Q*n+ .44+n- VAr-4-nlr A nfnk-ean++n~..
iL1lLU~L  JL'  L  Ill  ,  I.GJ  L  UJU  LLLJ  L  WULU  1  %ALU  L  %J  I  JLII  L1I'JA1.LL%ULLLL LL  LI LULILLOLVUj  A  VCLU  WW%  U  "JJ  L  "UJ  o'.  jFUL  LW&J5UI4  U)'
the United National Statistical Division.  rhe value added data are corrected for inflation using CPI
data from the Intemational Financial Statistics ofthe International Monetary Fund. We calculate the
real growth in value added figures for sectors on a three-digit ISIC level as well. We also calculate
the industry's share in total value added of the country, a variable used by Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Our measures of financial deDth (total credit to GDP. Drivate sector credit to GDP. and M2 to
GDP)F.u  a,-uu,d  he  evel  of Cj-DP  p  er c  apitLa  are  fro,,,1  heI  JLLtLerr.atioral  inLancialC  Statistics  VI  she
International Monetary Fund.
We use the Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) data set to time crisis and pre-crisis periods. Since
it is difficult to identify the crisis period precisely, we use (t- 1, t+l) as the crisis period, where t is the
first crisis year reported in Caprio and Klingebiel (2002). To ensure that the pre-crisis period is a
10aisunct penod not aiiectea by the cnsis, we separate the pre-cnsis penoa from me cnsis penoa Dy
three years. We define the pre-crisis period to be (t-8, t-4), if  t-8 is available, otherwise as many years
towards t-8 as possible, where t is the first crisis year reported in Caprio and Klingebiel (2002). This
restricts the pre-crisis period to a maximum of 5 years. We only allow for one crisis period in a
country, which is the first crisis mentioned in Caprio and Klingebiel (2002). to avoid identification
prbe.  1?  case  o~f recp;r,-,  cr.ses.oo
"J*^1%Jarnao  ;i  ea0%  t%f*  . AA*r  %I*  flj0.a
We  started  with  the  Caprio  and  Kiingebiei  (2002)  data  set  of systemic  banking  crisis
countries. This data set includes 113 banlcing crises from 93 countries since the 1970s. Due to data
constraints we need to drop a large number of countries. First, we do not have data on sectoral value
added for many crisis countries.  Second, we exclude countries for which we do not have data for
both the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. This excludes, for example, Poland for which we do not
have data fo; +'ke p-.4e=cii  period. We also A-o  o-le  for whic  we  +  dop  --- +--  hae-e-vau LIaVY%  IWL"  IVAl  U1%1 FL"-"'
0 1 0
j)I.LLlJ%A.  TV %,  "low'.  '.&Aj)  ZVJUU~II  YWIUY%..,  WV, UVF  llIVJ  114z  '  V  ,i  ,LLt.JL  V4LUv,
added data for at least five sectors. Tlhis excludes Argentina, for which we have only data available
for four sectors during the pre-crisis period. The final data set includes 19 crisis countries, including
both developing -and developed countries. Table 2 presents a list ofthese countries. For each country,
the table also shows the average real growth in value added and the number of sectors during both
the Dre-crisis and crisis period. We do not investigate the post-crisis periods, because we do not have
suicieIntIL  UaLa  on  pos-crisis  yea.-s foI  illaly  fU  the  '-Lu  s  Hill  Ukvu  baLuplv.
The  number of sectors varies widely  across countries  from  10 sectors in Hungary to  28
sectors in Chile, Finland, Israel or Sweden. To ensure consistency in a country across periods, we
examine the same sectors in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods. This excludes a number of sectors
for several countries for which we could obtain data in only one sub-period. We note that this setup
11may lead to a potential selection problem because the data in the Industrial Statistical Yearbook is
gradually becoming more comprehensive over time. Another potential selection effect would exist if
entire sectors disappear during the crisis period. The latter is however not the case in our sample.
Since we are interested in the difference in growth between the pre-crisis and crisis period, we need
to use a balanced panel. The final data set contains a total of 448 sector-country observations from 19
cr.sis cou,-,ies.
The number of firms within the sectors varies widely over time. In particular we see a large
increase in the number of firms within certain sectors at certain points in time. This maybe the result
of a re-classification  or the inclusion of firms that were previously excluded from the statistics on
value added.  In both cases, changes in value added are not related to firm performance,  and such
observations need therefore be excluded from the analysis. We have deleted all sectoral observations
if  LUe  rLU.Ver of  LIJLS  lWULL  UI,  OlVi.LL  sectoLraULU  JL-L1  ULWar.  LV0U0  VI  -/0  ,/0  (ubLL'U  UL  oLralIVeUj
between the pre-crisis and crisis periods. This criterion deletes around 5% of  observations across the
different sub-periods. We also have deleted observations if the real growth in value added exceeds
100%, which excludes only a small number of  cases.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of some variables that indicate changes in real sector
and financial sector activity for both the pre-crisis and during crisis periods.  When comparing the
summary statistics of tue pre-L[I1b1  d  cU  Lrbis periods,  we  irnu  Uth  folluwigU  C  w  lbi4almuLLisics.
During crises periods, on average countries experience lower real GDP growth, lower real growth in
sectoral value added (both for sectors that are highly dependent on external finance and sectors that
are not), lower real growth of M2, and lower growth of (private sector) credit. Financial crises thus
12are negat-iiy  corrieyc  du wiui reut and financial sector activity and performance. T  nese statistics aiso
indirectly provide some reassurance about the appropriateness  of the timing of the crisis periods.
Table 4 presents the pre-crisis levels of our proxies for financial development for our crisis
countries. The financial development proxies indicate relatively low levels of financial development
in countries  like Bolivia,  Chile,  Columbia,  and Mexico,  and relatively high levels of financial
developm.enmt in Hulngar,  Japan, and Spain.
V.  Results
First, we investigate the role of  financial development on the link between external finance
and sector growth for both pre-crisis and crisis periods. To this end, we estimate model (1) both for
the pre-crisis period and the crisis period. The regression results are presented in panel A of Table 5.
Each "pre-cr.sis" and "crisis" pair of columns Qes a dif,feren^.t r..easij  of fin an.cial developm.,e.n.t.  sAll
standard  errors  are  corrected  for heteroskedasticity.  Consistent  with the  findings  in Rajan  and
Zingales (1998), we find for the pre-crisis "normal" period that financially dependent sectors grow
on average disproportionally faster in countries with well-developed or deeper financial systems. In
our sample, however, this result is statistically significant at the  10 percent level for only the total
credit to GDP measure of financial development. This difference could partly be attributed to the fact
th.at ,ve  hav7e  fewver obsei-.ations  th.an Po2x,i 9mA  Zigae  (199)  since wefo.cus onc.ssw.ti
Another reason could be that we use extemal dependence  figures on a three-digit  level only. Our
coefficient estimates  for both the value-added share and the interaction  term also are somewhat
smaller than in Rajan and Zingales (1998).
During crisis periods, we find the opposite relationship, namely, that financially dependent
13sectors grow disproportionably slower in countries with well-developed or deeper financial systems.
In none of our specifications, however,  is the coefficient on the interaction term between financial
depth and external dependence statistically significantly different from zero.
In Panel B of  Table  5; we investigate whether the crisis relation differs from the pre-crisis
relatinn hv iiuing the differe  nce in real grnwth in vallie adiied hetwpen the rrkiq  npinnd and the nre-
crisis period,  AR VALGRI,  as dependent variabie (modei (2) in tne previous section). As in Panel A
we  have  three  alternative  specifications  with  each  using  a  different  measure  of  financial
development. The reduction in growth rate from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period is larger  for
financially dependent firms in countries with well-developed financial systems. The coefficient  of
the interact.ion ter  is statistically significantly different from zero in two ofthe three specification.
in other words, financially dependent firms appear to be hit aisproportionally by a financial cnsis it
they operate in countries with developed financial systems. The effect is economically significant.  A
one standard deviation increase in credit-to-GDP, for example, would reduce the difference in real
growth in value added between the crisis period and the pre-crisis period by 1.0 percent (and the
mean decline in real growth in value added between the crisis period and the pre-crisis period is 6.0
Next, we use a dummy variable that indicates high or low extemral dependence rather than a
continuous variable (models (3) and (4) in the previous section). The regression results are presented
in Table 6. The coefficient estimates and levels of statistical significance in Table 6 are very similar
to those in Table 5. The main difference with the results in Table 5 is that in Panel B the interaction
term between  HighAED  and FD, is now statistically qianificantlv  different frnm  zero  in  211  three
specificalouls.  LUCne  rIesuls  in T  ables  5  and  6 suggests that  in tiMies of crisis tere is  a negative
14relationsimp between the interacton term ot financial development or depth ot the financial system
and external dependence and real growth in value added.
VI.  Data and Measurement Caveats
We note a number of  caveats and qualifications with respect to our analysis. First, there is the
qus^;no  fuh.  velibiiyo  d,~4ata+  dA..g  crse.iMny  . leve.v  aable  rec  ,,.L  +...;  a lag t.ad.  oe
'J%Aw~.W.  lwax'  "&W  IWI1A"WA"tjP  MJL~  %s"LL"r,  %ILL%  IVJ.UIIY  1LILLUI-IVV%L  VCGLIGUII..O  I  Va'L  WI UI aG  IrLU  OuVF.I1'
shocks. Firm performance variables such as growth in value added tend to respond to financial crises
with a lag. Perhaps growth in value added is not a good measure of firm performance,  in particular
during periods of  crisis. In addition, financial development indicators such as credit to GDP tend to
increase during periods of crises as GDP decreases to a larger extent than credit.
Second, determining the precise timing of crises is difficult, both in terms of  identifying the
~~  'ninA  fka  p"A  nfr a  nr.co  A  -,
4
cvo  -,n  k ... A  -t  ni-nul-  .- A  -nn.  nn  I-.a  .A
IJ~'&W1I
6 41A4  II''  '1I1  .J±~11GW  V  ..'IOIa11(13UULIAUj  OLU V  IY  13UIIU  111(a7  LU  U~  I  N  CU  U  0'JUh1. beE,=n..g  r.dfheer.  of  c.sis  A  .si  .. ay  ld  p  lol  a.drla  not be r-esoleson
Especially in the case of a typical V-shape pattern of recovery from a crisis it is crucial to get the
timing right in order not to under- or overestimate the impact on firm performance.  We use the data
in Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) to define the beginning of a crisis and allow for a certain degree of
mistiming by using a three year period around the Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) year as crisis period.
Third, measures for the size of  the financial system relative to GDP may not be good proxies
for financial  dev,elopmren.t.  Durg periods  of credit  boomns,  ofen.  pr-eceding  financial  crises (see
Kaminsky and Reinhart,  1999),  for example,  (private) credit over GDP may overstate the level of
financial development or depth of the financial  system. In addition, the political-economy  of the
policy responses to a financial crisis could affect the availability of credit in crises (see Kroszner
(1998) and Klingebiel, Kroszner, Laeven and Van Oijen (2001)).
15Finally, one may question the appropriateness of the Rajan and Zingales (1998) proxy for
financial dependence  for our sample.  Their approach uses US external dependence  as proxy and
assumes the same technological reasons that make a particular industry in the US more dependent
on  external  finance  than  other industries  in the  US,  also  make  this  particular  industry  more
depeder.t  on xtarnol finance in  all ot4her co,uis  -ow,,i,A  +'he  ,rorldA  A 1*nirv  this asslaption is
plausible, it may not hold for all countries for country-specific reasons.  Many developing countries,
for example, support certain industries through subsidies. These industries maybe less dependent on
external finance than without those subsidies.
VII.  Conclusions
Trn normal crisic r,pinr.Aa tze f;nA  th at fvikof  4that  awe  ,.l1  i  ,n,we  rn  l  awt ,rn  vvtrnal  ow-
... k  L  - VT  *  I  b-b  _  A  -Vr  a  _  V  I  J  *-SD  W^_*_-  vlAf  _-J*  L  0__
grow disproportionally faster in countries with deep financial systems consistent with Rajan Zingaies
(1998).  When we  examine  crisis periods,  however, we find the opposite  relation:  crises in the
financial sector have a disproportionately  negative impact on sectors that rely heavily on external
sources of finance in countries with deep  financial  systems.  Our results provide evidence on the
mechanisms linking the financial and real sectors in a financial crisis.
WTe  ma
4
'.aesie  th,at a  deeper0,  fi.ncia~l  s..+...  allows,  sectors~  depe.nde.  nt  on.,+,....nl  Sfi.nn.-n
U-C&  aQ  II  J  LJUL.  U  JIQI'.LUILOj OLJ~  LLJL "JLJL'J  VY 0  0%IA,L%J1  0  UV~LL  A%JJIL  LI.L  VJLI VAI.%%J.LLUa  IL111a1ln.%
to  obtain  relatively  more  external  funding  in  normal  periods,  so  a  crisis  would  have  a
disproportionately negative effect on externally dependent firms in deeper financial  systems.  In
contrast,  since extemally  dependent  firms  tend  to obtain relatively less external  financing in a
shallower financial systems (hence the relatively lower growth rates in extemally dependent sectors
in such countries during normal times)- a crisis in such countries has less of an effect on the arowth
16of these  sectors. in addition, it could also be that deeper  financiai  systems are more efficient in
enforcing hard budget constraints on firms during a financial crisis than are financial institutions in
underdeveloped  financial systems.
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20Table 1  External Dependence  Across Industries in the United States During the 1980s
This table reports the median level of external financing for ISIC industries during the 1980's on a three-digit ISIC level.
We use the classification of the second revision of the ISIC. External dependence  is the fraction of capital expenditures
not finance with cash flow from operations. Cash flow from operations  is defined as in Rajan and Zingales (1998). For
the sectors  that  are already  on a three-digit  ISIC level  in Rajan and  Zingales  (1998)  we simply  use their external
dependence figures. For the sectors that are on a four-digit ISIC ievel in Rajan and Zingaies (i998) we re-calculate  the
weighted average external dependence figure for the four-digit ISIC sectors on a three-digit ISIC level using Cornpustat
and tne method  in Rajan and Zingaies (i998).
ISIC code  Industrial  sector  External dependence
314  Tobacco  -0.45
361  Pottery  -0.15
323  Leather  -0.14
324  Footwear  -0.08
372  Nonferrous metal  0.01
322  Apparel  0.03
353  Petroleum refineries  0.04
369  Nonmetal products  0.06
371  Iron and steel  0.09
311  Foodproducts  0.14
341  Paper and products  0.17
321  Textile  0.19
342  Printing and publishing  0.20
355  Rubber products  0.23
332  Fumiture  0.24
381  Metal products  0.24
3051  '--,su-;  l  ce.al  0.25
331  Wood products  0.28
354  Petroleum and coal products  0.33
384  Transportation  equipment  0.36
390  Other industries  0.47
362  Glass  0.53
382  Machinery  0.60
352  Other rhemicals  0.75
383  Electric machinery  0.95
385  Professional  goods  0.96
356  Plastic products  1.14
21Table 2  Average  Real Growth in Value Added for AU Sectors  Across Countries
Thg table --ports the rea! mrnuth in apptn  al  rnl ,a addAeA  ,p,.a=e  hy,  co-nt,n  and fnr  nbth pre.-.as;  andA crsais,  per.o
as well as the years of  each sub-period and the number of sectors included. The during crisis period is(t-1, t+1) where t is
the first crsis year rennrted in Caprio  and KlingPbiel  (2002).  The pre..sis peri odis  (t-8,  tA), if t-R  iq  qvniln1bl,
otherwise as many years towards t-8 as possible. The sample consists of a total number of 19 countries.
Pre-crisis  During crisis
Coun.-,  Real go-nth i.n  Years  Alu-e  oas  Numberof
value added  sectors  value added  sectors
Bolivia  0.046  1978-82  21  -0.079  1985-87  21
Chile  0.1!!  1970-72  28  0.038  1975-77  28
Colombia  0.061  1974-78  27  -0.038  1981-83  27
Eg,mpt  0 042  1983-87  24  0.032  1990-92  24
Finland  0.023  1983-87  28  -0.060  1990-92  28
Hungarv  0.054  19R3-87  10  -0=138  1990-92  10
Israel  0.057  1970-73  28  0.201  1976-78  28
Japan  0.054  1983-87  27  0.012  1990-92  27
Kenya  0.049  1977-81  23  0.038  1984-86  23
Malaysia  0.065  1977-81  22  0.041  1984-86  22
Mexico  0.055  1974-78  15  0.023  1981-83  15
New Zealand  -0.021  1979-83  26  -0.012  1986-88  26
Norway  -0.024  1979-83  27  -0.008  1986-88  27
Panama  0.019  1980-84  21  -0.206  1987-89  21
Spain  0.108  1970-73  25  0.131  1976-78  25
Sweden  0.035  1983-87  28  -0.222  1990-92  28
Turkey  0.071  1986-90  25  0.010  1993-95  25
Uruguay  0.021  1974-77  20  -0.133  1980-82  20
Zimbabwe  0.055  1987-91  23  0.006  1994-96  23
22Table  3  Summary Statistics Before and During Crisis
Both for the pre-crisis and during crisis periods,  this table list the summary statistics of the following variables:  real
growth in GDP, real growth in total credit, real growth in private credit, real growth in M2, real growth in value added of
highly dependent  (High ED) sectors, and real growth in value added of not-highly dependent (Low ED) sectors. The
highly dependent sectors are those sectors that are among the top-50% of most financially dependent sectors on a three-
digit ISIC level according to Rajan and Zingales (1998). Similarly, the not-highly dependent sectors are those sectors that
are among the bottom-50%  of most financially  dependent  sectors.  The total sample  includes  19 countries  and 448
industry-country observations.
Observations  Mean  Minimum  Maximum  Std Dev
Before Crisis
Pvesl~  Co,  s  -DP  7  !9  0.052  =003  0.1.60  0.040
Real growth in Total credit  19  0.118  -0.055  0.641  0.161
Real growtu  in Private Credit  i9  0.108  0.005  0.403  0.093
Real growth in M2  19  0.088  -0.040  0.494  0.125
Real growth in value added of High ED sectors  205  0.058  -0.439  0.333  0.098
Real growth in value added of Low ED sectors  243  0.037  -0.686  0.393  0.102
During  crisis
Real growth in GDP  19  0.005  -0.076  0.150  0.047
Real gTowth in Total credit  19  0_096  -0=150  0.736  0.227
Real growth in Private Credit  19  0.099  -0.237  0.634  0.222
ID  -al  gr0_'+U  vo,Kf,)  I  1  AMA  fl19A  A.A-.  A.4  017
Real growth in value added of High ED sectors  205  -0.018  -0.527  0.618  0.173
Real growth in value added of Low ED sectors  243  -0.0i0  -0.626  0.868  0.195
23Table 4  Financial Depth Indicators
This table reports total credit-to-GDP, private credit-to-GDP, and M2-to-GDP at the beginning ofthe pre-crisis period in
each countrv. These variables are used as proxies for financial depth. Data are from the International Financial Statistics
of IMF. Since the figures are for the first year of the pre-crisis period for each country, they are not directly comparable
across countries. The pre-crisis years can be found in Table 2.
Countrv  Total credit-to-GDP  Total private credit-to-GDP  M2-to-GDP
(pre-crisis)  (pre-crisis)  (pre-crisis)
Bolivia  20.13%  12.96%  19.26%
r1.1  --,  a,'n  ~ifn/  IC  IIAOI ~~_Ilmrl  ~~~~~I  1. LvJ70  O..3,L70  Li .- t  iO
Colombia  24.41%  14.69%  19.76%
Egypt  98.79%  26.02%  82.57%
Finland  54.35%  55.56%  44.68%
Hungary  100.88%  48.81%  47.69%
Israel  50.52%  29.94%  51.32%
Japan  113.52%  93.23%  93.55%
Ke-nyav  28.30%  19.92%  38.31%
Malaysia  31.49%  27.74%  45.95%
MIexiAco  ;7.25%  4.084%  5.47%
New Zealand  31.32%  21.57%  29.44%
Norway  54.34%  32.14%  52.94%
Panama  61.57%  54.36%  34.53%
Spain  75.11%  58.03%  54.13%
Sweden  73.77%  40.81%  54.26%
Turkey  38.32%  18.51%  28.52%
TTt.r,  ')I  2700Q  10 .1%0  108  AQO
Zimbabwe  25.27%  9.41%  25.58%
24Table 5  Value Added Growth,  Financiai Dependence,  and Financial Development:
Before and During a Financial Crisis, With Continuous Financial
Dependence  Variable
Dependent variable in panel A is real growth in value added of sector. Dependent variable in panel B is the difference in
real  crrnwth in  value  added  between  the  crisiq nerind  and  the  nre-crisis  nprind  Cnuntrien  include  Bolivia,  Chile,
Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, Spain, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Japan,  Kenya, Mexico, Malaysia, Norway, New Zealand,
Panama;  Sweden.  Turkey; Uruguay  Zimbabwe.  Cut-off for difference  in growth of number  of firms within sector
between  sub-periods  is +100% and -50%  (doubled or halved).  ED  is the  external dependency  figure in Rajan  and
Zinzales (1998) on a three-dizit ISIC level (see Table 1). Countrv and industrv durmmies are included. but not reported.
We use share in value added, total credit to GDP, private  credit to GDP, and M2 to GDP for the first year of the pre-
crisis period only. A constant was added,  but is not reported.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard errors between
brackets. * significant  at 10%  level; ** significant at 5%  level;  *** significant at 1%  level.
Panel A:
'anable  ,,~~Pe-crisis  C"X  r-r"  C  rec--  C
C  In  Value  AIde  .*.**1  *  . *  2  *  ***0.2'98O  A**-OJ3
(0.114)  (0.211)  (0.113)  (0.212)  (0.115)  (0.208)
UT%1 II  Tr_..1  I...*.  T(2%D  *0.-1  )  nl  £Y7'7
-IDIJ  * TL4al  Cr'etUIL to  GJLI*  U.07  -0.07I 7
(0.043)  (0.066)
ID  * Private C-.Ae+  't-DTD  A0A.05  Air,
(0.046)  (0.071)
ED * M2r  to GlD  0.044  -0.IAA
(0.057)  (0.099)
Prob>F  ***0°-°°  ***0°  °°  ***0° °°  ***0° °°  ***0° °°  ***0 °°°
R-sq1ared  0.207  0.384  0.204  0.382  0.2n4  0.388
Observations  448  448  448  448  448  448
.r ariel rvi:
Variable  Crisis  vs. Pre-crisis  Crisis  vs. Pre-crisis  Crisis  vs.  Pre-crisis
Share in Value Added  0.215  0.142  0.220
(0.242)  (0.240)  (0.244)
ED * Total Credit to GDP  **-0.225
(0.1;1)
ED * Private Credit to GDP  -0.124
ED * M2  to GDP  *-0.280
(A  IC  A\
P.ob>  ***0.000  ***0.0AAA  ***A0AAA rI uu-  V.UIU  u.uuu  bJ.bJUV
R-squared  0.296  0.288  0.295
Obl-serira  ,-;onLs  AAQ  AAQ  AAQ
25Table 6  Value Added Growth, Financial Dependence, and Financial Development:
Before and During a Financial Crisis, With Dummy Variable Indicating
High Financial Dependence
Dependent variable in panel A is real growth in value added of sector. Dependent variable in panel B is the difference in
real  arnwth  in value  added  hetwreen  the  erisis  pernnd  arnd  the nre  srise  ner:nol  Crinttries  iniuide Rolivia  Chile
Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, Spain, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Malaysia, Norway, New Zealand,
Panama- Sweden  Turkev- lJruguyv  7Zimbabwe=  Cut-off for difference  in grnwth  of number  of firms  within sector
between sub-periods is +100%  and -50%  (doubled or halved).  High ED indicates above median external dependence.
Country and industry dummies are included, but not reported. We use share in value added, total credit to GDP. private
credit to GDP, and M2 to GDP for the first year of  the pre-crisis period only. A constant was added, but is not reported.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard errors between brackets.  * siznificant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level:
significant at 1% level.
Panel A:
Variable  rre-crsis  Crisis  re-c  s  risis  rre-criSis  Crisis
inare in  vFalu auuau  A  - -- u.a3a  - - --u  - al  --  3i  -- u. 
(0.115)  (0.216)  (0.115)  (0.217)  (0.117)  (0.217)
TT-.L  !Th  W~.-l  - - . 1  f-T%"l4  I% nCr
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